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THE ROAD TO RESPECTABILITY: A
WOMAN OF PLEASURE AND COMPETING
CONCEPTIONS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
HarrietL. Turney*
Whenever the United States Supreme Court announces a constitutional decision that rejects a previously established interpretation, the
critics and scholars draw lines, choose sides, and attempt to reconcile
or show how the decision cannot be reconciled with the previous interpretation. Where the line is drawn or which side is chosen hinges upon
the constitutional theory embraced and advocated by the critic. Those
critics who adhere to a strict interpretational theory often attack the
more recent decision as being unfaithful to the framers' intent or the
strict letter of the written constitution. Other critics, who do not agree
that framers' intent is or should be controlling, may criticize the decision as not going far enough or as going too far. Some critics attempt
to justify the decision as being responsive both to historical antecedents and to contemporary social and moral attitudes, as well as to a
higher moral standard. Regardless of the approach taken, each critic
tries to square the decision with his or her theoretical preference.
Rather than advocating a particular constitutional theory as the "right
one" or directly entering the foray of attack or justification, this article has a. more limited purpose. It will identify a specific instance of
shift in constitutional interpretation as it concerns obscenity and the
first amendment and will attempt to explain and evaluate that shift in
terms of the concept-conceptions theory of constitutional interpretation.

I.

THE CONFLICT: 19TH-CENTURY OBSCENITY ACHIEVES FIRST
AMENDMENT RESPECTABILITY AND PROTECTION

In 1821, in one of the earliest obscenity cases on record in the
United States,' the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed
the conviction of Peter Holmes for publishing a book entitled Memoirs
*Instructor of Law, University of Toledo College of Law. B.A., Kent State
University, 1973; M.A., Kent State University, 1976; J.D., University of Dayton
School of Law, 1979.

I am indebted to Richard B. Saphire, Associate Professor, University of Dayton
School of Law and Beth Hampel, J.D., University of Dayton School of Law, 1979,
without whose support and encouragement, this article would not have been written.
1. Commonwealth v. Holmes, 17 Mass. 336 (1821); see also F. LEwIS, LITERATURE, OBSCENITY, AND LAW 5 (1976).
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of a Woman of Pleasure.2 The second charge in the indictment alleged
that the defendant:
[B]eing a scandalous and evil disposed person, and contriving, devising
and intending, the morals as well of youth as of other good citizens of
said Commonwealth to debauch and corrupt, and to raise and create in
their minds inordinate and lustful desire . . . knowingly, unlawfully,

wickedly, maliciously and scandalously, did utter, publish and deliver to
A.B. a certain lewd.., infamous and obscene printed book.., that...
would be offensive to the court here, and improper to be placed upon the
record thereof . ..

.3

One of the grounds upon which the publisher sought reversal was the
failure to set forth either the book itself or a description thereof in the
indictment so that the jurors could judge the obscenity of the book for
themselves." Absent from the defendant's petition was a challenge to
the conviction on first amendment grounds. 5
First amendment considerations were also notably absent from the
court's opinion. Additionally, although it is several pages long, only
one paragraph of the opinion addressed the publisher's contention that
the book or its description should have been made available to the
jury; the remaining portion was devoted to the defendant's jurisdictional challenge. 6 Rejecting the claim that the book should have been
offered into the record, the court simply stated:
[I]t can never be required that an obscene book and picture should be
displayed upon the record of the court: which must be done, if the
description in these counts is insufficient. This would require that the
public itself should give permanency and notoriety to indecency, in order
to punish it. 7
2. J. CLELAND, MEMOIRS OF A WOMAN OF PLEASURE (London circa 1749).
3. Commonwealth v. Holmes, 17 Mass. 336, 336 (1821).
4. Id. at 337.
5. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, of the press, or
the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for
redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added).
No distinction will be made in this article between the freedom of speech and
freedom of press clauses. I acknowledge that there is disagreement about whether the
clauses have independent status; however, the stress in this discussion is on freedom of
expression, spoken or written.
6. Commonwealth v. Holmes, 17 Mass. 336, 337-40 (1821). The defendant unsuccessfully challenged the jurisdiction of the court of common pleas to entertain the
action. Id.
7. Id. at 337 (emphasis added). The reference to pictures is probably attributable
to the fact that the 1821 edition of Memoirs contained "apparently erotic
illustrations." A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v.
Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 425 n.l (1966) (Douglas, J., concurring).
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Nearly 150 years after its initial condemnation, Memoirs of a

Woman of Pleasure, more commonly known under the title, Fanny
Hill, was again declared obscene under Massachusetts law.' This time
the suit was brought against the book itself rather than its publisher.9
Unlike the first suit, however, the decision was appealed to the United
States Supreme Court on the ground that the state court's decision
violated the first amendment. 1"
Applying and explicating a constitutional standard for obscenity,
articulated in a previous opinion, 1 the Court in a six-three decision
reversed the Massachusetts court. Mr. Justice Brennan, writing for
himself, Mr. Chief Justice Warren and Mr. Justice Fortas, set forth
the standard against which the allegedly obscene work was judged:
[I]t must be established that (a) the dominant theme of the material taken
as a whole appeals to a prurient interest in sex; (b) the material is patently
offensive because it affronts contemporary community standards relating
to the description or representation of sexual matters; and (c) the material is utterly without redeeming social value.' "

Mr. Justice Brennan agreed with the Massachusetts court that the
book met the prurient appeal and patent offensiveness criteria but
found reversal warranted because Memoirs possessed social value,
albeit a "modicum" thereof.' 3 Mr. Justice Douglas, concurring in a
separate opinion stated, inter alia, "the First Amendment, written in
terms that are absolute, deprives the States of any power to pass on the

value, the propriety, or the morality of a particular expression.", In a
companion case, Mr. Justice Stewart expressed the sentiment that "the
Constitution protects coarse expression as well as refined, and vulgarity
no less than elegance."' 5 Despite its inability to agree on the reasons,
8. A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v.
Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Fanny Hill III.
9. Id. at 415.
10. Id. at 417.
11. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957); see also Fanny Hill II, 383
U.S. 413, 418 (1966).
12. Fanny Hill II, 383 U.S. 413, 418 (1966).
13. Id. at 421.
14. Id. at 431. In this concurrence, Mr. Justice Douglas reaffirms the views he expressed while dissenting in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 508-14 (1957). 383
U.S. at 433. One of his concerns in Roth was the potential impact of suppression, "the
test that suppresses a cheap tract today can suppress a literary gem tomorrow." 354
U.S. at 514. Putting literary expression on a par with expression traditionally protected
by the first amendment, he expresses "the same confidence in the ability of our people
to reject noxious literature as [he has] in their capacity to sort out the true from the
false in theology, economics, politics, or any other field." Id.
15. Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 498 (1966) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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the majority determined that Memoirs, notwithstanding its long
history of disrepute, was worthy of first amendment protection, and
could no longer be banned as obscene.
These diametrically opposed decisions reached in the two Fanny
Hill cases illustrates a relatively common occurrence in constitutional
adjudication - the shift in judicial opinion in light of changing attitudes and beliefs. The second Fanny Hill case reflects an implicit rejection of its predecessor, which was presumably justified and
justifiable when rendered. An individual with even the most basic
knowledge of American history can understand why, in 1821, Fanny
Hill received no consideration as protected expression under the first
amendment; the book "describes in detail instances of lesbianism,
female masturbation, the deflowering of a virgin, the seduction of a
male virgin, the flagellation of male by female and female by male...
as well as more than twenty-three acts of sexual intercourse between
male and female."' 6 Yet, in 1966, Fanny Hill was afforded protection
under the first amendment on the ground that it was not obscene
under the constitutional definition.
These conflicting decisions raise very basic questions about constitutional interpretation. Assuming that Commonwealth v. Holmes"
was properly decided under the first amendment when it was rendered,
how can it be that the second case" s is also consistent with and faithful
to constitutional mandates? Failing to grant this assumption, can it be
argued with conviction that the Massachusetts court incorrectly denied
first amendment protection and the United States Supreme Court rectified the error? Can the converse be supported, that is, the Supreme
Court incorrectly extended constitutional protection to a book which
history recognized as obscene?
II.

RECONCILING THE CONFLICT: COMPETING THEORIES

Where should the search for answers begin? One constitutional law
scholar has suggested that "the essential first step of constitutional
analysis ...

begins, unavoidably, with some focus on the intent of the

Framers of our Constitution." 1 9 Another scholar has pointed out:
Whenever the United States Supreme Court has felt itself called upon to
announce a theory for its conduct in the matter of constitutional inter16.
17.

C. REMBAR, THE END
17 Mass. 336 (1821).

18.

Fanny Hill 1I, 383 U.S. 413 (1966).

OF OBSCENITY

251 (1968).

19. R. Saphire, Further Thoughts on the Role of History and the Notion of Constitutionalism (April, 1979) (unpublished memorandum available at the University of
Dayton School of Law) [hereinafter cited as Saphire, Memorandum].
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pretation, it has insisted, with almost uninterrupted regularity, that the
end and object of constitutional construction is the discovery of the intent of those persons who formulated the instrument or of the people
who adopted it. 20
One need not, however, look further than the two Fanny Hill cases to
recognize the veracity of the statement by two other scholars that
"[olne does not have to dig very deeply into the literature of American
constitutional law to suspect that many constitutional provisions do
not mean today what their framers thought they meant." 2"
The question of what role history and the intent of the framers
should play in constitutional interpretation and how the tension between stability and change should be maintained and balanced have
elicited much controversy and debate. The major source of disagreement seems to be over the extent to which the contemporary Court is
bound by the framers' intent and the constitution as written.
A.

The Strict HistoricalApproach

Raoul Berger has expressed the opinion that the Constitution
serves as a "transcript" of the framers' thinking.22 Posing the question, "[w]hy is the 'original intention' so important," 23 Berger
responds with a quote from Madison: "if 'the sense in which the Constitution was accepted and ratified by the Nation ...

be not the guide

in expounding it, there can be no security for a consistent and stable
government, more than for a faithful exercise of its powers.' ,,2, From

this he concludes that "[a] judicial power to revise the Constitution
transforms the bulwark of our liberties to a parchment barrier." 2'
Berger rejects attempts to discredit the original intention approach on
the grounds that "the legislative history" is incomplete2" or that "only
present current meanings are pertinent." 27 Under Berger's theory of
constitutional interpretation:
20.

ten Broek, Use by the United States Supreme Court of Extrinsic Aids in Con-

stitutional Construction, 27 CAL. L. REV. 399, 399 (1939) [hereinafter cited as ten
Broek].

21.

Munzer & Nickel, Does the Constitution Mean What It Always Meant?, 77

COLUM. L. REV. 1029, 1029 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Munzer & Nickel].
22. R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 372 (1977) [hereinafter cited as R.
BERGER].

23.
24.
25.

Id. at 364.
Id.
Id.

26.

Wofford, The BlindingLight: The Uses of History in Constitution Interpreta-

tion, 31 U. CHI. L. REV. 502, 502-15, 518-28 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Wofford].
27. R. BERGER, supra note 22, at 369 (quoting Curtis, The Role of the Constitutional Text, in SUPREME COURT AND SUPREME LAW 64, 68 (E. Cahn ed. 1954)).
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'[I]f the idea of a document of superior authority' - the 'fixed Constitu-

tion' to which the Founders were attached - is to have meaning, terms
which have a precise history filled content to those who drafted and
adopt the document . . . or to which they attach a clear meaning ...
must be held to that precise meaning.2
"To hold otherwise is to convert the 'chains of the Constitution' to
ropes of sand." 2 9
Reduced to admittedly simplistic terms and applied to the two Fanny Hill cases, Berger's approach requires the Court to discern the
framers' intent in drafting the first amendment in order to determine
whether this form of expression was contemplated within the meaning
of the terms. If freedom of press and speech were not meant to include
such expression, then, regardless of present social values or moral standards, the protection of the first amendment should not be extended to
the book. Thus, if the framers did not consider that the first amendment would protect matter which depicts explicit sex acts, then it
should not, at the present time, be explicated in such a way that would
permit such matter to be afforded protection.
This strict historical approach has been criticized by several
scholars.3 0 First, it has been noted that this approach "cannot account
for the actual extent of change in our constitutional law." 3" Perhaps
even more significant to the attack is the notion:
Even if we can establish that the goal of the authors of, say the first
amendment, was to ensure that public issues could be fully and freely
discussed, this provides us with little guidance in balancing this goal

against competing goals such as ensuring public security, or in dealing
with nonpolitical literature."
The difficulty in ascertaining the intentions of the collective mind of
the framers has also been cited as a drawback to a strict historical approach.3 3
Moreover, Wofford suggests that "if we are really searching for
the states of mind of those responsible for the presence in the Constitution of a particular provision, it is hard to understand why we should
be particularly concerned only with those who drafted the provision or
28.

R.

BERGER,

supra note 22, at 371 (quoting Hurst, The Role of History, in
ed. 1954)).

SUPREME COURT AND SUPREME LAW 55, 57 (E. Cahn
29. R. BERGER, supra note 22, at 371.

30. E.g., ten Broek, supra note 20; Munzer & Nickel, supra note 21; Wofford,
supra note 26.
31. Munzer & Nickel, supra note 21, at 1031.
32. Id. at 1032-33 (footnotes omitted).
33. Wofford, supra note 26, at 508.
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supported it actively." 3' 4 He explains that before the provision became
(or becomes) part of the Constitution, it had (or has) to clear a number
of hurdles, each of which involve getting the consensus of a large
number of citizens." The essential point to Wofford is that "what was
accepted at Philadelphia (or in Congress in the case of the amendments) and later ratified was a group of words, not the intended interpretation of those words - whether expressed or unexpressed. Only
'
the document itself bound the nation, both then and now." 36
The words of the Constitution are themselves no less problematic
than the intent behind the document since we are not privy to the
minds of those who selected them nor to the minds of those who
ratified the provisions. Unlike Berger, Wofford suggests that "some
words which probably did have a 'precise' content in 1787 . . . have
been permitted to expand in their legal uses as they have expanded in
their non-legal uses. ' 3 7 The Court has explained the process of word
changes:
[W]hile the meaning of constitutional guarantees never varies, the scope
of their application must expand or contract to meet new and different
conditions which are constantly coming within the field of their operation .... [A] degree of elasticity is thus imparted, not to the meaning,
but to the application of constitutional principles .... 11
The above reasoning may explain how the various provisions have
been adapted to new inventions such as the airplane or the automobile
or to other innovations in science or technology, but it may be less
satisfying when applied to a case like Fanny Hill. If the meaning of the
first amendment has not changed since it was adopted, it is difficult to
understand why the amendment did not protect the book in 1821, but
was deemed applicable in 1966. Obviously, the book's content did not
change in the 145 year interim. Under the strict historical approach,
the most reasonable conclusion that can be reached is that the Court
incorrectly decided the second Fanny Hill case in 1966.
B.

Richards and Dworkin: Concepts and Conceptions

There is, however, another way to explain and evaluate the more
recent decision by the Court, which seems to reject previously accepted
notions of constitutional law, without arriving at the conclusion that
the modern Court lacks sensitivity to the role of history and framers'
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id.
Id. at 509.
Id.
Id. at 519.
Village of Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
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intent. This theory, implicated by the writings of contemporary rights
theorists, most particularly Ronald Dworkin and David Richards,
recognizes a "vital distinction between concepts and conceptions." '3 9
Dworkin rejects a strict interpretation of the text of the Constitution
for the reason that it "yield[s] a narrow view of constitutional rights,
because it limits such rights to those recognized by a limited group of
people at a fixed date of history." ' Instead, Dworkin advocates
recognition of the concept-conception distinction. Dworkin's position
has elicited the following comment:
Essentially, he [Dworkin] argues that our recognition that most major
constitutional provisions assume the forms of concepts, as opposed to
conceptions for re-defining much of the contemporary criticisms leveled
at activism in the Supreme Court. Once we understand that distinction,
we are freed from the preexisting sense of responsibility to tie contemporary constitutional interpretations to the specific problems and context
confronting the Framers. He suggests that the very definition of constitutional concepts not only gives us the right but even the responsibility to
make the Constitution meaningful for today's problems, and that we can
own perceptions of
do so in a manner fully consistent with the Framers'
1
the enterprise in which they were engaged.4
Dworkin himself explains the theory in his essay, "Constitutional
Cases, "2 by illustrating the distinction between the concept of fairness
and the conception of fairness. He describes the concept of fairness:
Suppose a group believes in common that acts may suffer from a special
moral defect which they call unfairness, and which consists in wrongful
division of benefits and burdens, or a wrongful attribution of praise or
blame. Suppose also that they agree on a great number of standard cases
of unfairness and use these as benchmarks against which to test other,
more controversial cases. In that case, the group has a concept of unfairness
39.

....41

Saphire, Memorandum, supra note 19, at 3. See, e.g., R.

RIGHTS SERIOUSLY

DWORKIN, TAKING

(1978) [hereinafter cited as R. DWORKIN]; Richards, Human Rights

as the Unwritten Constitution: The Problem of Change and Stability in Constitutional
Interpretation, 4 U. DAY. L. REV. 295 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Richards, Human
Rights]. See also Saphire, Professor Richards' Unwritten Constitution of Human
Rights: Some Preliminary Observations, 4 U. DAY. L. REv. 305 (1979) [hereinafter
cited as Saphire, Some Preliminary Observations); J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE
(1971) [hereinafter cited as J. RAWLS].
40. R. DWORKIN, supra note 39, at 134.
41.
42.

Saphire, Memorandum, supra note 19, at 3.
R. DWORKIN, Constitutional Cases, in TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 134-35

(1978).
43.

Id. at 134.
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He then shows how the concept of fairness is distinct from conceptions
of fairness. The members of the group who have accepted the concept
of fairness may differ over controversial cases that do not clearly fall
within the benchmark cases. The members may have or act "on a different theory of why the standard cases are acts of unfairness""" or
they may disagree "on which more fundamental principles must be
relied upon to show that a particular division or attribution is unfair."5
These differences and disagreements represent different conceptions of
fairness.
Under Dworkin's theory, the intent of the framers is not viewed as
an attempt to impose their particular views of the "vague" terms of
the Constitution upon subsequent generations. "Instead, the concepts
embodied in the most important, morally significant constitutional
provisions were intended to set out broad standards to provide
touchstones to which subsequent generations would be expected to
refer for direction. ' " 6 Rather than being constrained to conform to the
framers' conceptions which are inherently limited by cultural, political,
and social conditions existing at the time, the concepts provide a basis
from which "to develop new, more relevant conceptions.""' These
conceptions may "be different than the particular conceptions the
framers themselves may have had [but are] ultimately capable of being
embraced within, and justified in terms of, the concept which the
framers established.""
Like Dworkin, Richards also adopts the concept-conceptions
distinction in the development of his constitutional theory. Unlike
Dworkin, who seems to recognize the existence of numerous concepts
from which conceptions have developed, Richards develops an overarching concept of human rights, which he explicates "in terms of two
features: the capacities of personhood, sometimes called autonomy,
and equality." ' ' 9 For Richards, the concept "should be and is worked
out in constitutional cases to an articulation of contested, evolving,
and perhaps sometimes competing conceptions of that concept." 50
Speaking of personhood, Richards states: "the idea of human
rights appears importantly to rest on the idea of persons as bearers of
rights in virtue of certain capacities for taking critical attitudes toward
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id. at 135 (DwORKIN'S emphasis).
Id.
Saphire, Some Preliminary Observations, supra note 39, at 308.
Id.
Id.
Richards, Human Rights, supra note 39, at 297.
Saphire, Memorandum, supra note 19, at 3.
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living their lives."II He makes the point that persons, unlike lesser ad-.
vanced forms of life, "adopt various forms of critical attitudes toward
their own lives." 52 As to the second feature, equality, Richards states:
"the idea of human rights expresses a normative point of view which
puts an equal weight on each person's capacity for autonomy,""
which may also be articulated as "equal concern and respect, ...
universalizability ....
and ... equal parties to the social contract." ' 5'
Richards recognizes that the concept of human rights is "highly
abstract and general."15 5 He also recognizes that the concept, because
of its abstractness and generality, is an object of considerable controversy which includes the "battles over conflicting conceptions of the
underlying concept." ' 5 Succinctly put, "the road to clarity and concreteness is marked by either the corpses of defeated conceptions or
the flags of those that have proved victorious." 7
Although both Dworkin and Richards propound a theory which
appears to be less faithful to the framers' intent or the original understanding than the approach advocated by Berger, neither rejects the
basic premise that history is relevant to constitutional interpretation.
Nor do they suggest that the framers' intent or original understanding
should not be considered in appraising the Court's activism. Dworkin
says that "[i]f courts try to be faithful to the text of the Constitution,
they will for that very reason be forced to decide between competing
conceptions of political morality."" Defending the Warren Court
against the attack that it "failed to treat the Constitution as a binding
text," 5 9 he states that "if we wish to treat fidelity to that text as an
overriding requirement of constitutional interpretation, then it is the
conservative critics . . . who are at fault, because their philosophy ignores the direction to face issues of moral principle that the logic of
the text demands." 6 0
Richards, too, readily acknowledges the role of history in constitutional interpretation. In fact, it is apparent that history is integral
to his theory:
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Richards, Human Rights, supra note 39, at 297.
Id.
Id.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 299.

Id.
Saphire, Some Preliminary Observations, supra note 39, at 315.
R. DWORKIN, supra note 39, at 136.
Id.
Id.
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A constitutional theory is richer and more explanatory to the extent that
it has more historical resonances, enabling us to enter into the way of
thinking of earlier controversies over constitutional doctrine. The
jurisprudence of rights enables us to do so because it takes seriously ideas
of human or natural rights which were part of the historical matrix of
constitutionalism, and enables us to understand and61 yet critically
evaluate the forms of earlier constitutional controversy. '
Contrary to Berger, however, who maintains that the precise meaning
of the terms of the constitution as perceived by the framers must be
followed, Richards theory allows for change without challenging the
change on the ground of infidelity. He explains: "The Constitution
was intended to have a long historical durability; truth to its spirit requires that the underlying philosophy and concept be preserved, not
fidelity to antique and indefensible specific conceptions which, had the
founders been alive today they would have rejected outright.'6
Richards' concept of human rights affords an innovative approach
to understanding changes which have occurred in constitutional law. It
accounts for decisions like the Fanny Hill tandem, where the results
reached in the later case is diametrically opposed to the one reached in
the earlier one. Berger's approach would probably require us to applaud the first decision and condemn or severely criticize the later one
because the Court evidenced a "change of mind." The conceptconception dichotomy enables us to evaluate the decisions as articulations of conceptions which can, in turn, be assessed on the basis of
their fidelity to the underlying concept. Richards theory, which
acknowledges stability but recognizes the need for change, not only
allows for the rejection of older decisions which are out-moded or less
relevant to current attitudes and conditions, it encourages rejection
when those decisions no longer seem supportable in contemporary
society. This process is the battle of conceptions, hopefully with the
victor being both relevant to current moral, political and philosophic
concerns, and faithful to and consistent with the over-arching concept
of human rights.
IV.

CONCEPTS AND CONCEPTIONS: APPLYING THE THEORY
TO THE FANNY HILL CASES

To understand how the concept of human rights accounts for the
recent Court decision on Fanny Hill, it is necessary to explore how
freedom of expression guarantees serve the identifiable features of
61.
62.

Richards, Human Rights, supra note 39, at 300 (footnote omitted).
D. RICHARDS, THE MORAL CRITICISM OF LAW 10 (1977).
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autonomy and equality. It is also necessary to consider the origins of
the provision and the conceptions which were articulated during and
after its adoption. This will enable us to understand the earlier case. It
will also set the stage for a brief discussion of the battle of conceptions
- the changing judicial attitudes and the more contemporary conceptions about the first amendment as it relates to obscenity.
A.

Freedom of Expression and the Concept of Human Rights

Richards, in his article on free speech and obscenity, 3 discusses the
first amendment as it relates to the Rawlsian theory of justice. Although the article focuses on Rawls' moral theory - the theory of
justice based on a contractarian analysis - it is nonetheless helpful in
elucidating Richards' own theory of the concept of human rights and
the role of freedom of expression in relation to that theory." As a starting point, Richards discusses the essential elements of an adequate
moral theory. He states that it would:
[E]xpress the intuitive features of the common sense notion of morality,
organizing these features in a constructive and determinate way. The central features of morality are mutual respect - treating others as you like
to be treated in comparable circumstances; universalization - judging
the morality of principles by the consequences of their universal application; and the minimalization of fortuitious human differences . . .as a
basis for differential treatment."
The central feature, mutual respect, is implicit in Richards' concept
of human rights because the features which it identifies, automony and
equality, can never be realized if a person does not respect himself or
other persons. He describes self-respect as "a belief in the competent
independence and integrity of one's person. '"6 This seems to be
another way of stating autonomy. It is fairly obvious that a person
cannot achieve this automony - the ability to govern one's life as a rational being and to enjoy that life' - if others do not respect his right
to make choices and decisions that would, in that person's opinion,
best serve his personal goals. Likewise, if one person believes that he is
superior to another, he is likely to expect differential treatment which
63. Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral Theory of the
First Amendment, 123 PA. L. REv. 45, 123 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Richards, Free
Speech]. See also J. RAWLS, supra note 39.

64. In fact, it can probably be argued with some success that Richards' theory is
merely a variation of Rawls' theory. It is, however, well beyond the scope of this paper
to pursue that question.
65. Richards, Free Speech, supra note 63, at 59-60 (footnotes omitted).
66. Id. at 63.
67. Id.
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must necessarily impinge upon another's autonomy. Equality requires
persons to respect others at the same level and degree to which they
respect themselves. Mutual self-respect is simply a restatement of the
Golden Rule.
The first amendment, according to Richards, is derived from selfrespect." Its significance "rests on the central human capacity to
create and express symbolic systems.., intended to communicate in
determinate, complex and subtle ways."" Because it "permits and encourages the exercise of these capacities," 7 0 it supports a mature individual's sovereign autonomy in deciding how to communicate with
others. 7 '
Richards suggests that "constitutional notions of free speech and
free press should be understood in terms of the relevant requirement of
the first principle of justice, namely, the greatest equal liberty of communication compatible with a liberty for all."" If the government imposes regulations that are at odds with this idea, if it permits "people
to communicate only in ways to which no one has any serious objection," 7 individual autonomy is compromised impermissibly under the
constitutional mandate of the first amendment.
The concept of human rights is nurtured and sustained through the
guarantees of the first amendment. The ability to communicate or not
communicate, to disseminate or receive new and different ideas is key
to the preservation of automony. Without this protection, persons are
not able to realize autonomous self-determination because their
possibilities are limited. Restraints on expression necessarily create inequality because some persons are prohibited from expounding or
receiving communications which can generate critical attitudes toward
their lives or can assist them in effectuating changes in their lives. With
this model in mind, the various conceptions of the first amendment
can be examined, compared, and evaluated.
B.

The First Amendment in Historical Perspective

Historically, concerns for freedom of expression antedate the
American experience by thousands of years. "Who in society is to be
silenced, who is to be prosecuted for his utterances, who is to be
denied what we now refer to as freedom of speech - these questions
68.

Id. at 62.

69. Id.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 66-67.
Id. at 68.
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have confronted almost all societies in the past twenty-five centuries." 74 As this passage suggests, the focus of the concern has often
been on the extent to which expression ought to be suppressed rather
than on expansion of the liberty. Plato and Socrates are both purported to have opposed unrestricted expression and to have accepted
the authority of the state to punish disobedience." "[T]he law of
Moses enjoined slander, particularly when directed against authority;
the earliest Roman Codes punished disruptive speech by clubbing and
worse .... ,,76 In the 16th-Century, Martin Luther and his works were
ordered to be burned in effigy by Pope Leo X," and John Milton
reports that Galileo was under house arrest in Italy when Milton visited
him, for his advocation of Copernican theory.78
Censorship in England can be traced back to Henry VIII who, in
1529, issued his first proclamation containing a list of prohibited
books." He and his successors "acted upon the principle that the
peace of the realm demanded the suppression of all dissenting
opinion." 8 A licensing system for all books printed in England was
established by the Proclamation of 1538 with the penalty for violations
being "not only his Gracis most high displeasure and indignation, but
also the loss and forfeiture to the kind of all goods and chattel and fine
and imprisonment at the will of the crown."'" While the licensing
system was in force, authors and printers of unacceptable works were
hung, quartered, mutilated, exposed in the pillory, and flogged. 2
One of the first significant works denouncing the English licensing
8 3
system is John Milton's Areopagitica.
Objecting to the system which
required all manuscripts to be submitted to crown officials empowered
to expunge objectional passages or to deny a license altogether (in
classic prior restraint style), Milton wrote: "Give me the liberty to
know, to utter, and to argue freely according to conscience, above all
74.

H. BOSMAJIAN, THE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF FREEDOM OF SPEECH, In-

troduction, ix (H. Bosmajian ed. 1971).
75.

F. SIBERT, T. PETERSON & W. SCHRAMM, FOUR THEORIES OF THE PRESS 12

(1975) [hereinafter cited as FOUR THEORIES OF THE PRESS].
76. Lange, The Speech and Press Clause, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 77, 92
(1975)(footnote omitted).
77. H. BOSMAJIAN, THE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF FREEDOM OF SPEECH, Introduction, ix (H. Bosmajian ed. 1971).
78. Milton, Areopagitica, in COMPLETE POEMS AND MAJOR PROSE 737-38 (M.
Hughes ed. 1957) [hereinafter cited as Areopagitica].
79. F. SIEBERT, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN ENGLAND 1476-1776, 25, 44 (1965).
80. Id. at 25.
81. Id. at 49.
82. TASWELL-LANGMEAD, ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 736-37 (2d ed.
1880).
83. Areopagitica, supra note 78.
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liberties."" Although this comment has been lauded for its liberality
and is rightly considered one of the antecedents of the first amendment, the entreaty was only a limited one. Milton did not urge liberty
for all persons in like manner; rather, he specifically excepted "popery
and open superstitution, which, at as it extirpates all religion and civil
supremacies, so itself should extirpate .
"...8 John Locke, another
great 17th-Century libertarian, who deserves credit for influencing the
drafters of the first amendment, believed that "no opinion contrary to
human society, or to those moral rules which are necessary to the
preservation of civil society, are to be tolerated by the magistrate. '",
Far from being a paradise of free expression, one writer has noted that
"at the time of the adoption of the American Constitution, the only
guarantee of freedom of speech that existed in England was that of
freedom of speech and debate in Parliament." 87
Against this historical backdrop of repression of unpopular ideas,
with occasional (although limited) outcries for the liberation of expression, the American experiment began to take shape. Englishmen began
to speak out more fervently in the 18th-Century in favor of the
freedom of expression and the American ear was finely turned. Colonial newspapers reprinted many of Cato's letters.8 In one letter,
reprinted in a New York newspaper in 1734, the following sentiments,
which sound very like Richards' perceptions about the import of free
expression, were enunciated:
Without Freedom of Thought, there can be no such Thing as Wisdom,
and no such Thing as public liberty, without Freedom of Speech, which
is the right of every Man, as far as by it he does not hurt or controul the
Right of another: And this is the only Check it ought to suffer, and the
only Bounds it ought to know.8 9
Of course, this is only one pre-constitutional statement to which
the colonialists were exposed. Publication of unpopular ideas was still
urged as a crime:
A Printer ought not to publish every Thing that is offered him; but what
is conducive of general Utility, he should not refuse, be the Author a
84. Id. at 746.
85. Id. at 747.
86. J. LOCKE, A Letter Concerning Toleration, in VI THE WORKS OF JOHN LOCKE
45 (1801).

87.

E.

HUDON, FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN AMERICA

14 (1963).

88. L. LEVY, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FROM ZENGER TO JEFFERSON 10 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as L. LEVY].
89. Cato's Letters: or Essays on Liberty, Civil and Religious No. 15, as reprinted
in the New York Weekly Journal, February 18, 1734; see L. LEVY, supra note 88, at
11.
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Christian, Jew, Turk or Infidel. Such a refusal is an immediate Abridgement of the Freedom of the Press. When on the Hand, he prostitutes his
Art by Publication of any Thing injurious to his Country, it is criminal,
- It is high Treason against the State. 90

By the time of the Continental Congress of 1774, freedom of the
press was recognized as being essential to "the advancement of truth,
science, morality and arts in general" and to the maintenance of
"honorable and just modes" of conducting public affairs." When a
provision for the protection of freedom of expression was omitted
from the original Constitution, Richard Henry Lee, a leading antiFederalist, denounced the omission. According to Lee, "[a]ll parties
apparently agree, that the freedom of the press is a fundamental right,
and ought not to be restrained by any taxes, duties, or in any manner
whatever.""' Fearing that Congress would use the powers specifically
conferred upon it to levy against the press, Lee urged the people to
consider the importance of a free press which he perceived to be:
[Tihe channel of communication as to mercantile and public affairs; by
means of it the people in large countries ascertain each others sentiments;
are enable to unite, and become formidable to those rulers who adopt
improper measures. Newspapers may sometime be vehicles of abuse, and
of many things not true; but these are but small inconveniences, in my
mind, among many advantages.'
The federalists lost the battle to keep freedom of expression out of
the Constitution but temporarily won the battle to limit its application.
In 1798, less than ten years after the adoption of the first amendment,
the Alien and Sedition Laws were enacted by the Federalist majority;
section 3 provided that "any person [who] shall write, print, utter or
publish

. . .

any false, scandalous and malicious writing

. . .

shall be

punished.' ' 4 The section also provided that the truth of the matter
charged as libel could be given in evidence in defense and a jury could
determine both the law and fact under a court's direction."
This legislation illustrates one early conception of the first amendment, that is, that ideas uttered or published which could be conLivington, Of Use, Abuse, and the Liberty of the Press, in XL THE INDEPENAugust 30,
1753; see L. LEVY, supra note 88, at 75-82.
91. To the Inhabitants of the Province of Quebec, October 24, 1774, in I JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789, 108 (1904-37).
92. Richard Henry Lee, Letter XVI, January 20, 1788, reprinted in L. LEVY,
supra note 88, at 143-44.
93. Id. at 144.
94. Act of July 14, 1798, 1 Stat. 596-97.
95. Id.
90.

DENT REFLECTOR OR WEEKLY ESSAYS ON SUNDRY IMPORTANT SUBJECTS,
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sidered detrimental to the government did not come within the purview
of the amendment's protection. Other exclusionary conceptions are
evidenced in the state laws which make either blasphemy or profanity,
96
or both, statutory crimes.
The earliest conceptions of the first amendment seem to have one
common denominator - social utility. Although disagreement existed
about how society was best served, it was the public good, and expression which contributed to it, that were protected. This is not to say
that the provision was not considered to confer an individual right;
such a claim would have to ignore the statements of men like Milton,
Cato, Lee and the members of the Continental Congress, among
others. On the other hand, the types of expression which were excluded
from the first amendment's protection were those which contributed
nothing to, or had the tendency to undermine, society. Where the expression furthered political and social advancement or discussion (and
controversy) in an acceptable way, it was considered unrestrainable.
Where it somehow threatened to weaken the fiber of society, it was
condemned.
C.

The Battle of Conceptions

It is but a short side-step to include a book like Fanny Hill in the
class of expression which, to the 17th- and 18th-Century mind, had a
tendency to undermine society. Written expression replete with explicit
description of normal and deviant sexual activities does not seem to
have been specifically considered by the framers when drafting the first
amendment. Yet, one need only compare a portion of the wording of
the Sedition Act, "write, utter or publish scandalous and malicious
writing," ' 97 with the indictment against Peter Holmes, "wickedly,
maliciously and scandalously, did utter, publish and deliver . . . [an]
obscene printed book," 9 to come to the conclusion that publication of
the latter was, if possible, a worse crime against society than defamation of the government. Indeed, Fanny Hill was accused of having the
capacity to "debauch and corrupt" the "morals . . . of youth as of
other good citizens" and being "manifest corruption and subversion"
of the citizenry.9 9 The reason given by the court for refusing to require
the book to be placed on the public record was its offensiveness and
the court's reluctance to give "permanency and notoriety" to inde96.
97.
98.
99.

See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 482-83 n.12 (1957).
Act of July 14, 1798, 1 Stat. 596-97.
Commonwealth v. Holmes, 17 Mass. 336, 336 (1821).
Id.
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cency.' 0 0 As expression which not only did not contribute to the social,
and moral, good but was considered damaging to the character of the
citizenry, the book fits squarely into the category of expression which
weakened social fiber.
The conception of the first amendment which excludes from its
ambit those expressions which depict explicit and unnatural sex acts,
because of their debilitating effect, became more fully articulated in
the 18th-Century. The early test for obscenity, borrowed from English
common law,'"' considered "whether the tendency of the matter
charged as obscenity is to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are
open to such immoral influences, and into whose hands a publication
of this sort is likely to fall.'" 0 It was applied to works likely to suggest
"thoughts of a more impure and libidinous character."'0 3
The Hicklin test was specifically adopted in a federal court in 1879,
in United States v. Bennett.'0 The court sanctioned the following
distinction between what is and what is not freedom of speech and
press:
All men in this country, so far as this statute is concerned have a right to
their opinions . . . . Freelovers and freethinkers have a right to their
views, and they may express them, and they may publish them; but they
cannot publish them in connection with obscene matter, and then send
that matter through the mails .... Freedom of the press does not include
freedom to use the mails for the purpose of distributing obscene
literature. III
In United States v. Harmon,'6 the federal obscenity statute was
directly and vigorously assailed on first amendment grounds. In
response to the attack, the trial judge argued that while our institutions
afford the widest latitude to expression of opinions "touching questions of social ethics, political and domestic economy and the like, it is
for the lawmaking power to draw the "boundary line between liberty
and license."' 0 7 Thus, although the courts in these cases upheld the
liberty of public discussion and debate on political, social, and ethical
questions, this did not include the liberty to publish obscene material.
The Hicklin test, which permitted the court to examine isolated
100.
101.

Id. at 337.
The Queen v. Hicklin, L.R. 3 Q.B. 360, 371 (1868).

102.
103.

Id.
Id.

104.
105.
106.
107.

24 F. Cas. 1093 (C.C.N.Y. 1879).
Id.at 1101.
45 F. 414 (D. Kan. 1891).
Id. at 416.
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passages of a book in order to evaluate its "tendency to deprave and
corrupt,"' 08 was finally abandoned in 1934.109 In the opinion of Judge
Augustus Hand, the question was not whether select passages of
Ulysses were obscene, but rather, "whether such a book of artistic
merit and scientific insight" should be regarded as obscene within the
statute."' Acknowledging that "while in not a few spots it is coarse,
blasphemous, and obscene,""' Judge Hand concluded that the book
did not "tend to promote lust." 1 ' "[T]he same immunity should apply to literature as to science, where the presentation, when viewed objectively, is sincere, and the erotic matter is not introduced to promote
lust and does not furnish the dominant note of the publication."" 3
The new standard by which obscenity was to be judged was "whether a
publication taken as a whole has a libidinous effect.""'
The Ulysses decision articulated a new conceptualization of what is
encompassed by the first amendment. Under this new conception, the
indicted matter must be considered as a whole, with the court's inquiry
focused on determining whether the matter tended to promote lust or
could be viewed as having such attributes as "artistic merit" or "scientific insight."' 5
Judge Manton's dissent in Ulysses remains faithful to the defeated
conception, which rejects literary merit as a redeeming criterion:
If we disregard the protection of the morals of the susceptible, are we to
consider merely the benefits and pleasures derived from letters by those
who pose as the more highly developed and intelligent? To do so would
show an utter disregard for the standards of decency of the community
as a whole and an utter disregard for the effect of a book upon the
average less sophisticated members of society, not to mention the adolescent."16
Judge Manton's position is one of concern for the moral fiber of society.
He expresses concern for the well-being of the community and fears
that literature like Ulysses will have an adverse moral effect on the
common man who, because of his commonality, may fall prey to his
passion if exposed to temptation." 7
108. The Queen v. Hicklin, L.R. 3 Q.B. 360, 371 (1868).
109. United States v. One Book Entitled Ulysses by James Joyce, 72 F.2d 705 (2d
Cir. 1934).
110. Id. at 706.
111. Id. at 707.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 706.
116. Id. at 711 (Manton, J., dissenting).
117. Id. at 710-11.
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Judge Hand's opinion exalts fiction to the level of science and
medicine. Concerned with the development of literary ideas as they inquire into "thoughts and lay bare the souls of a number of people" in
a "realism characteristic of the present age,""' Judge Hand expresses
the view that "[a]rt certainly cannot advance under compulsion to
traditional forms, and nothing in such a field is more stifling to progress than limitation of the right to experiment with a new
technique.""' Judge Manton, however, feels no compulsion to let artists experiment when morality is in the balance. "The court cannot indulge any instinct it may have to foster letters. The statute is designed
to protect society at large, of that there can be no dispute; notwithstanding the deprivation of benefits to a few, a work must be condemned if it has a depraving influence."' °
On one level, this judicial disagreement can be viewed as the expression of two different perspectives and two conflicting responses to
the same question: What is in the best interest of society? For Judge
Hand, the answer is the promotion of unfettered ideas which may contribute to man's understanding of himself, his fellowman and his surroundings. For Judge Manton, the answer is to suppress the ideas and
influences which tend to corrupt the fragile psyche and lure it into
committing unacceptable, anti-social, behavior.
On another level, the battle can be viewed as the tension between
stability and change, which is acceptable as an inevitable aspect of the
concept-conception dichotomy. Judge Manton, the advocate of stability in both a historical and moralistic sense, merely espouses maintenance of the status quo. While not as responsive to changing views,
he is certainly sensitive to historical stimuli. Judge Hand, the proponent of change, is undoubtedly less faithful to his forefathers' views on
what is acceptable and unacceptable in terms of free expression.
On the other hand, the majority opinion is more sensitive to the
changing social and moral values of its time. Ulysses was decided on
the heels of the roaring 20's and the new era of sexual freedom in
America. American fiction in the opening decades of the 20th-Century
reflects this shift in values. Such authors as Theodore Dreiser, William
Faulkner, and Sherwood Anderson broached sexual topics that had
long been considered forbidden in conversation and print. Sister Carrie 1 was "a pioneering novel of sexual candor."' 2 " Rape and
118.
119.
120.
121.

122.

Id. at 706.
Id. at 708.
Id. at 711 (Manton, J., dissenting).
T. DREISER, SISTER CARRIE (1900).
Howe, Afterword to T. DREISER, AN AMERICAN TRAGEDY 815 (The New

American Library ed. 1964).
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voyeurism were introduced in Sanctuary.'" Sherwood Anderson dared
to suggest homosexuality in Winesburg, Ohio.'" These books, written
in a period of realism, could not have been faithful to their milieu
without portraying the language and behavior of the era. Fidelity required the depiction of behavior which deviated from acceptable, conventional mores. With this trend toward more sexual freedom, and less
concern toward public notions of morality, it is not surprising that the
conceptions of freedom of expression began to clash. Nor is it surprising that the conception reflecting the realities of the then contemporary society should emerge slightly ahead.
The next step in the evolution of obscenity law under the first
amendment came in 1957, when the Supreme Court decided Roth v.
United States.'25 Roth had been convicted for mailing obscene advertising and an obscene book. Faced squarely for the first time with
whether obscenity is within the arena of constitutionally protected
speech or press, the Court came to the conclusion that it did not.' 26
Relying on the belief that the "protection given speech and press was
fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing
about of political and social changes desired by the people,'"'2 the
Court declared, "implicit in the history of the First Amendment is the
rejection of obscenity as utterly without redeeming social importance.'"" The definition of obscenity which emerged from Roth has
been stated, "whether to the average person, applying contemporary
community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a
whole appeals to prurient interest."' 29
The dissent of Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Black attacked
the definition on the ground that it:
[Glives the censor free range over a vast domain. To allow the State to
step in and punish mere speech or publication that the judge or jury
thinks has an undesirable impact on thoughts but that it is not shown to
be a part of unlawful action is drastically to curtail the First Amendment
....The danger of influencing a change in the current moral standards
of the community, or of shocking or offending readers . ..can never
justify the losses to society that result from interference with literary
freedom. '30
123.

W.

124.

S. ANDERSON,

FAULKNER,

SANCTUARY (1931).
WINESBURG, OHIO 24

(1919).

354 U.S. 476 (1957).
Id. at 485.
Id. at 484 (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 489.
Id. at 509 (Douglas, Black, J.J., dissenting) (quoting Lockhart & McClure,
Literature, The Law of Obscenity and the Constitution, 38 MINN. L. REv. 295, 387
(1954)).
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
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The disagreement here between the majority and the dissent is little
different than that between Judge Hand and Judge Manton some thirty
years before. The question is still the same: What is in the best interest
of society? The majority's answer is contained in a quoted excerpt
from Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire:3
T

There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the
prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise
any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene .... It
has been well observed that such utterances are no essential part of any
exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as to step to truth
that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by
the social interest in order and morality.
The dissent of Mr. Justice Douglas answers the question a different
way:
The absence of dependable information on the effect of obscene
literature on human conduct should make us wary. It should put us on
the side of protecting society's interest in literature .. .
I have . . . confidence in the ability of our people to reject noxious
literature as I have in their capacity to sort out the true from the false in
theology, economics, politics, or any other field.'"
Conventional morality is the victor in Roth; unfettered exchange of
ideas as they pertain to sexual matters is the loser. The test is one
which puts the fate of expression into the hands of the people - those
who can assert enough pressure on the courts. Historically, the position is supportable when one recalls that the first amendment was
adopted by framers who were familiar with and who used restraint on
speech which threatened the established order. The emphasis on the
need for redeeming social value is consistent with historical prospective. It is the dissent which calls for maximum exposure. Unlike the
majority, it expresses confidence in the rational capabilities of the individual to consider his options and choose for himself.
This brings the discussion back to the case of Fanny Hill.'3 4 In the
years since its initial condemnation, there had been significant changes
in social and sexual attitudes. Isolated passages of a book could no
longer be considered apart from the work as a totality.' 35 The newer
131. Id. at 485.
132. Id. at 511 (emphasis added).
133. Id. at 514.
134. Fanny Hill II, 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
135. See note 114 and accompanying text supra.
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test did not, however, help this particular book. Even considered as a
whole, Fanny Hill was susceptible to the Roth definition. Charles
Rembar, who represented the novel before the Supreme Court, has
remarked, "it is true that not a single word in Memoirs, standing
alone, could possibly offend anyone. (Cleland's combinations, of
Course, are something else.)"' 3 6 Moreover, the author of Fanny Hill
had little reputation as a great writer, unlike James Joyce of Ulysses or
D.H. Lawrence of Lady Chatterly's Lover, which had overcome
judicial hurdles after Roth. "A 1961 treatise, whose authors were both
learned in the field and liberal in outlook, used it as an example of the
'deliberately and flagrantly erotic.'"137
Despite the many factors that seem to go against a victory, the
Court held that Fanny Hill passed the constitutional test for obscenity.
The decisive factor in its favor was the Court's determination that the
book was not "utterly without redeeming social value." '38 Stressing
that the three criteria under the test are to be applied independently,
"the social value of the book can neither be weighed against nor
canceled by its prurient appeal or patent offensiveness." 39 In support
of the independent criteria, the Court quotes the following in footnote:
'"[M]aterials dealing with sex in a manner that advocates ideas . . .
or that has literary or scientific or artistic value or any other form of
social importance, may not be branded as obscenity and denied constitutional protection.' ""I°O
Because the book was viewed as having
social value, the fact that it appealed to prurient interest and was
patently offensive was insufficient in these three Justices' opinion to
exclude it from first amendment protection.
Mr. Justice Brennan did qualify the opinion by warning that there
might be some context in which the book would fall within the
obscenity test."' If, for example, the book were to be exploited for
commercial gain, to the exclusion of all other values, it might meet the
third criterion. The emphasis here was placed on the intent of the
disseminator, that is, the reasons for which someone disseminated the
book might affect the social value of the book. Any confusion the
reader might have with how this transformation of the book's value
can occur depending upon who distributes it and for what reason is
shared by Mr. Justice Douglas in his concurring opinion. He agrees
136.
137.

C. REMBAR,
Id.

THE END OF OBSCENITY 224 (1968).

138. Fanny Hill II, 383 U.S. 413, 419 (1966).
139. Id.
140. Id. at 419-420 n.7.
141. Id. at 420.
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that the book should not be banned but disagrees that the motive of
the distributor can transform a book's value, stating: "[It is] . .. inexplicable how a book that concededly has social value can nonetheless
be banned because of the manner in which it is advertised and sold.
However florid its cover, whatever the pitch of its advertisements, the
contents remain the same."'" 2
The opening lines of Mr. Justice Clark's dissent in the case is
reminiscent of the court's opinion in the 1821 case. Prefacing his opinion, he writes: "In order to give my remarks the proper setting I have
been obliged to portray the book's contents, which causes me embarrassment. However, quotationsfrom typical episodes would so debase
our Reports that I will not follow that course." I" Undoubtedly, Mr.
Justice Clark and Judge Parker would have had much in common.
The dissent also assails the social value test in a way which is reminiscent of Judge Manton's dissent in Ulysses:
To say that social value may 'redeem' implies that courts must balance
alleged esthetic merit against the harmful consequences that may flow
from pornography. Whatever the scope of the social value criterion ...it
at least anticipates that the trier of fact will weigh evidence of the
material's influence in causing deviant or criminal conduct, particularly
sex crimes, as well as its effect upon the mental, moral, and physical
health of the average person."'
Once again the struggle is between different opinions of what is in
the best interest of society. On the one side, the majority likens the
value of literature to science and reveres the expression of ideas, even
though they may be unconventional or anti-social. On the other side, is
the concern for convention, and the fear that such expression will
cause sickness in the frail mind and body of the ordinary person who is
unable to resist succumbing to temptation.
One is also reminded of Dworkin's illustration of the difference
between concepts and conceptions of unfairness. He pointed out that
different members of the group who share a common belief that they
call unfairness may, nevertheless, differ over controversial cases. These
differences, he posits, suggest that the individual members of the
group each has or acts on a different theory of "why the standard
cases are acts of unfairness."'' 4 5 This is similar to what seems to be
operating within the Supreme Court when it decided Fanny Hill. The
142. Id. at 427 (Douglas, J., concurring).
143. Id. at 441 (Clark, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
144. Id. at 451.
145. R. DwoRKiN, supra note 39, at 135. See also notes 44-45 and accompanying
text supra.
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Justices appear to express different theories or positions about why
some expression should be labeled as obscene and why some should be
afforded first amendment protection. The arguments on both sides are
interestingly articulated in synonymous terms - the majority using
social value with one connotation; the dissenters expressing concerns
for other facets of society, which are also social values.
In all of these tests and definitions of obscenity, it would be easy to
lose sight of Richards' concept of human rights. Yet, it is this concept
that is the yardstick by which these cases can be measured. The
features of the concept, autonomy and equality, are the values which
the amendment is supposed to protect and preserve.
It is evident that we can understand the older conceptions by consideration of historical and contemporary settings. The court in 1821,
which upheld the obscenity conviction without even a passing reference
to the first amendment, probably never considered the possibility that
the amendment might be applicable. At that time, the guarantees of
free expression only pertained to certain kinds of ideas - those which
were political in nature or those which could in some way benefit the
interests of society and in the process, benefit the interests of the individual. Repression of expression that was anti-institutional government and religion was still the law. The country was still experiencing
growing pains which sustained a feeling of paranoia inherited from its
English parentage.
The -intermediary decisions were reflective of their surroundings
and their historical antecedents. Sex, the mystery with which present
day society has still not come to grips, was a necessary human activity,
little understood and not discussed in polite society. "The proper exercise of sexual function was rigidly defined in terms of one mode,
marital reproductive sexuality."'" 6 With the relaxation of attitudes
toward sex and the human body came less restriction and increased
recognition that expression which depicts sexual matters may have a
purpose other than exploitation.
It is the other purpose or purposes which undoubtedly assisted the
advent of the social value test. The more common treatment of all
aspects of society, that is, sexual as well as political and communal,
also hastened the Fanny Hill standards. It is difficult to say if early
20th-Century writers began to depict sex more openly and more frequently in their works because of changing attitudes toward sex or if
attitudes were changed by more open sexual depiction in the literature.
In any event, the changes occurred, and under Richards' theory, it was
146.

Richards, Free Speech, supra note 63, at 58.
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necessary for the Court to reflect them, and to assume the responsibility
of discarding older conceptions when they were no longer relevant.
D.

Concept and Conceptions in the Aftermath of Fanny Hill

The victorious conception articulated by the Court in the second
Fanny Hill case enjoyed only a short-lived reign. The "utterly without
redeeming social value" criterion announced by the Court in that case
was specifically rejected less than a decade later.'" In its place, the
Court substituted "whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious
literary, artistic, political, or social value.'" One of the reasons given
for this change was that the previous criterion "called on the prosecution to prove a negative .... a burden virtually impossible to discharge
under our criminal standards of proof."' 4 9 Mr. Chief Justice Burger,
writing for the majority, concluded that "[w]e do not see the harsh
hand of censorship of ideas - good or bad, sound or unsound - and
'repression' of political liberty lurking in every state regulation of commercial exploitation of human interest in sex." ' '3
The Court also clarified the community standard requirement to
resolve the conflict over whether the term implied a "national" or
"local" appraisal. 'Finding it unrealistic to "read the First Amendment
as requiring that the people of Maine or Mississippi accept public
depiction of conduct found tolerable in Las Vegas, or New York,""'
the Court held "that the requirement that the jury evaluate the
materials with reference to 'contemporary standards of the State of
California' . . . is constitutionally adequate."' 52 Rather than requiring
a judge or jury in a particular locale to discern the "national" attitude
toward the allegedly obscene material, the Court explicitly condones a
narrower evaluation on the grounds that "[pleople in different states
vary in their tastes and attitudes."' 5 3
The dissent of Mr. Justice Douglas expresses the competing conception which, in this case, is dealt a humbling defeat. "The idea that
the First Amendment permits government to ban publications that are
'offensive' to some people puts an ominous gloss on freedom of the
press."'"' "The idea that the First Amendment permits punishment for
147.
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ideas that are 'offensive' to the particular judge or jury sitting in judgment is astounding."'" Acknowledging that the material before the
court "may be garbage"'5 6 Douglas makes the point that "much of
what is said in political campaigns, in the daily press, on TV, or over
the radio"'" is also garbage. He also points out that "[tjhe First
Amendment was not fashioned as a vehicle for dispensing tranquilizers
to the people. Its prime function was to keep debate open to 'offensive' as well as to 'staid' people." 1"
The battling conceptions are no different in Miller than they were
in Roth almost twenty years earlier" 9 nor are they any different than
those competing when the Court decided the fate of Fanny Hill. 6' 0 One
conception reflects the historical social reluctance to afford first
amendment protection to sexually explicit material because it violates
public notions of morality and the best interests of society. The other
conception stresses individual choice and the unfettered communication and reception of ideas, regardless of their unconventionality,
social acceptability or their ultimate subject matter.
The difference in the outcome of Miller is that the Court reelevates the majoritarian conception and exalts conventional notions
of public morality in a specific geographical location so that they
become the controlling factor in determining whether the material is
obscene. Under the concept-conception approach to constitutional interpretation, the outcome of Miller can be viewed as an appropriate
response insofar as it reflects a shift in public attitudes. If it is appropriate for the Court to be sensitive to and reflect changing attitudes, then it was appropriate for it to assume the responsibility of
discarding its position in Fanny Hill.
On the other hand, it is also apparent that the Miller Court fell far
short of insuring the preservation of autonomy and equality.' 61 If it
were being truly responsible to the concept as Richards views it, there
would have been no repression of the material at issue in the case or of
any of the material which is currently labeled as obscene. Every
judicial or legislative act of repression impinges upon the person's
ability for self-determination; it requires him to shape his life without
the benefit of additional viewpoints. Choices are limited by banning
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so-called obscene matter in the same way that choices are limited by
repression of political or scientific matter. Material which may help a
person develop sexual attitudes and to determine his own sexual
destiny are withheld from him. Equality is also hampered by restrictions on sexual expression. Those who are inhibited by mandate are
disadvantaged in a way that those who accept conventional morality
are not. Mutual respect, which is constitutionally or statutorily mandated as it pertains to race, age, national origin, and handicap, is not
enforced when it pertains to sexual attitudes and the depiction of sexual activity. Tolerance is fundamental to equality, yet in Miller, the
Court sanctions intolerance and repression of sexual expression that
does not comport with community standards.
Miller, coming as it did in the aftermath of Fanny Hill, illustrates
the tension between stability and change in constitutional interpretation, and the tenuousness of dominant conceptions. Fanny Hill
departed significantly from historical antecedents but was perhaps
merely a logical "next step" in the struggle toward unrestrained individual freedom and the over-arching concept of human rights.
Miller, however, reflects the more conservative historical approach and
is more consistent with older precedent and the older conceptions. Of
the conceptions at conflict in Miller, the victor is relevant to current
moral concerns but is much less faithful to, and is flagrantly inconsistent with, the over-arching concept of human rights.
Using the concept as a yardstick for evaluation, the critic who embraces Richards' theory of constitutional interpretation may well
criticize Fanny Hill as falling short of constitutional mandates because
it continued to permit repression of much sexually explicit material.
The same critic would also probably agree that the decision was an inroad to the ultimate goal. On the other hand, an appraisal of Miller
would most certainly be negative and much more severe because the
decision appears to retreat back to a position previously rejected and
does so in a way that permits much greater infidelity to the concept
than its more radical but less compromising predecessor.
V.

CONCLUDING COMMENTS

The concept-conceptions theory is not a pure theory like Einstein's
theory of relativity or the Brownian theory of motion because, unlike
theories postulated in the physical sciences, it is not susceptible to external or physical verification or refutation. It is more akin to a
skillfully written poem, rich with meaning and full of ambiguity and
potential interpretations. Because of this, it will not enjoy unanimous
recognition as the "correct" theory of constitutional interpretation
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol5/iss2/3
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but, for the same reasons, it will probably not be completely rejected
as having no validity or worth. The critics will debate over its meaning
and validity, and will criticize each others' interpretations of the
theory. Like literary criticism of poetry, many more pages will be
devoted to critiques of the theory and interpretations of it than it takes
to articulate the theory itself.
No attempt has been made in this article to offer any critical
judgments about the correctness of the concept-conceptions theory;
rather it has focused on applying the theory in a specific, albeit very
narrow, area of constitutional law. Since it seems appropriate to
visualize the theory in context as a prerequisite to responsible and
responsive criticism, this article has attempted to reduce the inherently
abstract language of the theory into concrete application - to see how
it works in practice, separate from the attendant questions of validity,
worth or usefulness.

Published by eCommons, 1980

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol5/iss2/3

